U.S Foreign Policy towards Middle East
After World War II, the overriding concern of American foreign policy was finding a new way to check Soviet expansion and influence throughout the world. The Middle East, specifically, was a vulnerable target for the U.S. and Soviet Union after British and French colonialism. That said, US foreign policy towards the Middle East was not completely linear during the past century. Instead, it can be divided into two periods — during the Cold War and after the Cold War. During the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy was mostly a reaction to Soviet strength, position, and action. [1] After the Cold War, the Middle East — being considered as part of the Third World, was to be “exploited” for the needs of the industrial societies and to “fulfill its major function as a source of raw materials and a market.”[2] In other words, peace and oil have been the main focus of US foreign policy in the Middle East after the Cold War.
During the Cold War, the Soviet goal was to achieve strategic parity with the United States by expanding its naval military reach through the Middle East. In turn, America sought to deny the Soviets access and expansion to Middle Eastern territory through the policy of containment. At the beginning of 1955, Soviet found a promising start and fertile grounds for expansion in Syria and Egypt. They were the cultural and political center of the Arab world. More importantly, the Soviets were able to exploit the “tide of Arab nationalism and… Arab-Israeli enmity”[3] with the vulnerability of Syria to adjoining Israel and unfriendly Western-backed neighbors. However, the Soviets were largely unable to make any progress in places where anti-Israeli or anti-American sentiment ran dry — like Turkey and Iran under the Shah. In these places, Soviet penetration was not effective in nurturing “creeping communism, internal subversion, and conquest by proxy.”[4] The only potential mass communist movement was the Tudeh party in Iran, headed by Mossadegh, was blown off by the U.S. coup of 1953. As of the Moscow Summit of 1972, the Soviet failed to be a military patron to an Arab world intent on prosecuting the war against Israel. On the other hand, the United States was the sole guarantor of security to Israel and its regional allies and could bring overwhelming force to bear in their defense.[5] By 1983, it was concluded that “neither the Egyptians nor the Lebanese nor the Jordanians nor the Saudis seem to want the Soviets involved.” [6] In the end, the United States not only managed to retain Soviet expansion, but also succeeds on its own strengths as a viable regional peacekeeper, and with more extensive basing rights and naval access — the strategic superiority to the Soviet. Nevertheless, the 1973 oil embargo damaged U.S. interest of consistent access to Arab oil. However, the situation shifted when the U.S moderated its position to “insisting on Israeli concession to make a settlement possible.”[7] The sum effect was to make America the far more indispensable patron, which served it well in preserving access to oil and eroding Soviet influence.
As the political table turned, the new regime in Iran marked the end of the country’s close relationship with the United States. Iran’s disapproval of superpower activity put out the flame better ween United States and Soviets in the Middle East, especially after the Iran-Iraq War. With the absence of Soviet threats, the United States completely shifted its focus to peace and oil. In terms of peace, the US was deeply involved in the Israeli-Egypt peace treaty, the Israel-Syria peace treaty, and the more recent Israeli Palestinian peace treaty. In all, if there were fewer conflicts in the Middle East it would not only save the U.S. money and resources spent on troops deployment and fighting costs, but also human capital of bright American lives.
[3]Xinbo, Wu (2010), “Understanding the Geopolitical Implications of the Global Financial Crisis,” The Washington Quarterly, 33:4, p. 157, 159.
[4]Baldwin, Hanson. “Strategy of the Middle East.” Foreign Affairs 35, no. 4 (1957): 662
[6] Reich, Bernard, and Alexander J. Bennett. “Soviet Policy and American Response in the Middle East.” Journal of East and West Studies 13, no. 2 (1984): 101
[7]International Institute for Strategic Studies. “The Middle East War.” Strategic Survey 74, no. 1 (1973): 33
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